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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Damages-Wrongful Death-Evidence of Improvident
Attitude of Decedent
Garfield Hanks was convicted of non-support and ordered to pay
$10 per week for support of his children. Later Hanks filed a com-
plaint for absolute divorce, alleging an agreement respecting custody and
support of the three minor children. The next day, and before service
of this summons and complaint, Hanks was killed when struck by the
defendant's train at a crossing. His wife as administratrix successfully
brought an action for wrongful death, and put in evidence the gross earn-
ings of deceased for the past several years and his average weekly wage
at the time of his death. The defendant excepted to exclusion of the
non-support judgment and the summons and complaint for divorce, as
well as to exclusion of its offer of the inventory of Hanks' estate. On
the appeal, by a 4-3 decision, the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that exclusion of the evidence was error.1
There are two main theories in general use for determining the
amount of recovery in a wrongful death action :2 (1) loss to surviving
relatives, or the amount of money and services these relatives would
have received had the deceased lived out his life expectancy, and (2) loss
to the estate, which, depending upon the jurisdiction, is (a) present
worth of probable gross earnings less personal expenses had death not
occurred, (b) present worth of probable savings of deceased had death
not occurred, or (c) gross earnings during the life expectancy which
was cut short.
The North Carolina statutes provide for an action for wrongful
death, in which a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury
may be awarded and disposed of in the manner of personal property
in case of intestacy.3 The statutes do not detail the manner in which
this pecuniary injury shall be measured, but leave this question to judicial
determination. As to this measure of damages, North Carolina can be
placed in category (2) (a), namely, the present worth of probable gross
earnings less personal expenses had death not occurred.4
1 Hanks v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 230 N. C. 179, 52 S. E. 2d 717 (1949).
2 McCORMICK, DAMAGES §95 (1935).
8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-174 (1943) : "The plaintiff in such action may recover
such damages as are a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injury re-
sulting from such a death." N. C. GEN. STAT. §28-173 (1943): ". . . The amount
recovered in such action is not liable to be applied as assets, in the payment of
debts or legacies, except as to burial expenses of the deceased, but shall be dis-
posed of as provided in this chapter for the distribution of personal property in
case of intestacy."
'Rea v. Simowitz, 226 N. C. 379, 38 S. E. 2d 194 (1946); White v. N. C.
R. R., 216 N. C. 79, 3 S. E. 2d 310 (1939) ; Gurley v. Southern Power Co., 172
N. C. 690, 90 S. E. 943 (1916); Mendenhall v. N. C. R. R., 123 N. C. 275, 31
S. E. 480 (1898) ("The measure of damages is the present value of the net
pecuniary worth of the deceased to be ascertained by deducting the cost of his
own living and expenditures from the gross income, based upon his life ex-
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North Carolina decisions have made it perfectly clear that there is a
marked distinction between the North Carolina statute based on present
worth of the net pecuniary value of the life of the deceased, and statutes
of other jurisdictions, including the Federal Employer's Liability Act,
based on the pecuniary loss sustained by the beneficiaries ;5 that the num-
ber and age of children dependent upon deceased is inadmissible on the
damage issue in a wrongful death action ;O that whether or not deceased
would have accumulated anything should not be considered ;7 that the
cause of action did not belong to the deceased, and that those entitled
to receive damages do not claim through him ;8 and that the personal
expenses of deceased which are to be deducted from gross earnings to
arrive at expected net income do not include contributions to the sup-
port of his family or dependents." These decisions indicate that North
Carolina has confined the question of damages in a wrongful death action
to finding out (1) how much money decedent would have made if he
had lived, and (2) how much of this he would have spent on himself
alone, independently of family expense. After this is done, the personal
expenses are subtracted from gross income. The present worth of this
sum is then the dollar and cents amount recovered.' 0 According to the
majority opinion, the abandonment and non-support order, the complaint
for divorce with custody agreement, and the inventory of the decedent's
estate were offered in evidence "to show the character of the deceased
and his disinclination to provide for dependent members of his family."
A number of North Carolina decisions contain statements that character
evidence is admissible in a wrongful death action." These opinions do
pectancy.") ; Benton v. N. C. R. R., 122 N. C. 1007, 30 S. E. 333 (1898) ("The
measure of damages for loss of life of plaintiff's intestate is the present value of
his net income, and this is to be ascertained by deducting the cost of living and
expenditure from his net gross income and then estimating the present value of
the accumulation from such net income, based upon his expectation in life.").G Carpenter v. Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N. C. 130, 131 S. E. 400
(1925) ; Horton v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 175 N. C. 472, 95 S. E. 883 (1918).
Bradley v. Ohio R. & C. R. R., 122 N. C. 972, 30 S. E. 8 (1898).7 Roberson v. Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co., 154 N. C. 328, 70 S. E. 630(1911)..
' Hood v. American T. & T. Co., 162 N. C. 92, 77 S. E. 1094 (1913).
"Rigsbee v. Atlantic C. L. R. R., 190 N. C. 231, 129 S. E. 580 (1925).
"0 "Under the state law, the damages for the pecuniary worth of the deceased
are to be ascertained by deducting the probable cost of his own living and usual
or ordinary expenses from the probable gross income derived from his own ex-
ertions based upon his life expectancy (Purnell v. Railroad, 190 N. C. 573, 130
S. E. 313). And, in ascertaining these damages, the jury is at liberty to take
into consideration the age, health, and expectancy- of life of the deceased, his
earning capacity, his habits, his ability and skill, the business in which he was
employed, and the means he had for making money-the end of it all being to
enable the jury fairly to determine the net income which the deceased might
reasonably have been expected to earn, had his death not ensued." Carpenter v.
Asheville Power & Light Co., 191 N. C. 130, 131 S. E. 400 (1925). "If a man's
net earnings are but $100 per annum, that is his pecuniary value to his family,
whether large [family] or small." Kesler v. Smith, 66 N. C. 154 (1872).
Hancock v. Wilson, 211 N. C. 129, 189 S. E. 631 (1936); Poe v. Raleigh
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not deal with whether or not character evidence is admissible generally,
or for a specific purpose, but in at least one case it is stated that evi-
dence of the character of the deceased was relevant only on the question
of his earning capacity.' 2 The dissent in the principal case states that
any evidence not excluded by a specific rule of law and having a logical
tendency to show either probable gross income of deceased or probable
costs of deceased's own living and personal expenses should be admitted.
The view of the dissent would seem to be correct, as evidence of char-
acter or otherwise which tended to show probable earnings or spendings
of the deceased would bear upon the question of expected net income
of the deceased. It is submitted, however, that unless character evi-
dence does tend to show either probable earnings or personal expendi-
tures of the deceased, it is irrelevant on the issue of damages in a
wrongful death action in North Carolina.
The majority opinion would admit the evidence to show the character
of the deceased because it tended to show a lack of a provident attitude
by the deceased toward his family. Following this viewpoint, the court
seems to be adopting a loss to the beneficiaries theory, for it is self-
evident that a family whose husband and father had been quite generous
in providing for their needs and desires has lost by his death more from
a financial standpoint than a family whose husband and father was nig-
gardly in his support. But if those designated by statute to receive the
recovery receive an amount dependent only upon the father's probable
earnings and personal expenditures, provident attitude or lack of one
would be immaterial.
A great deal of the language used in a number of earlier North
Carolina decisions on the measure of damages in wrongful death actions
would seem to indicate that the measure of damages in North Carolina is
the pecuniary advantage which might be expected from continuance of
deceased's life by the family,13 or pecuniary worth to the family. 14 The
first of these, the case of Kesler v. Smith,15 was decided in 1872 and
the opinion in the case states that the statute under which the action
was brought provided that the amount recovered in a wrongful death
action should be for the exclusive and sole benefit of the widow and
issue of the deceased' 6 in all cases where they are surviving. Conse-
& Augusta A. L. R. R., 141 N. C. 525, 54 S. E. 406 (1906); Mendenhall v. N. C.
R. R., 123 N. C. 275, 31 S. E. 480 (1898).
12 Speight v. Seaboard A. L. Ry., 161 N. C. 81, 76 S. E. 684 (1912).
" Burton v. Wilmington & W. R. PL, 82 N. C. 505 (1880).
14 Burns v. Asheboro & M. R. R., 125 N. C. 304, 34 S. E. 495 (1899) ; Menden-
hall v. N. C. R. R., 123 N. C. 275, 31 S. E. 980 (1898); Kesler v. Smith, 66
N. C. 154 (1872).11; 66 N. C. 154 (1872).
"
8 Actually, though this wording was enacted in 1855, N. C. Pub. Laws 1868-69,
c. 113, §72 had changed this provision to read that recovery would be disposed
of as provided for personal property in case of intestacy.
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quently the term, "injury to the family" was used in that case, and later
cases merely repeated it. Later cases seem to omit the phrase "to the
family," and in a more recent case' 7 it is stated that the recovery for
the value of a child's life is not what his services might have been worth
to someone else during his minority, but what his entire life would have
been worth to himself if he had lived. In Queen City Coach Co. v.
Lee' s8 the judge's charge was "pecuniary worth (of deceased) to his
estate," and this was held to be in accordance with North Carolina
authorities. If there is no family or next of kin to take the recovery,
the University of North Carolina is entitled to the recovery' 9 indicating
clearly that the recovery does not depend on loss to the family of the
decedent.
Evidence of the provident attitude of the deceased was admited in
one case20 when offered by the plaintiff, but it was considered that the
evidence of deceased's having been a good provider for his family
showed a constant attention to his business, and thus was admitted to
show earning capacity. In the principal case, the non-support order,
the divorce complaint, and the inventory do tend to show lack of a
provident attitude by deceased, but tend very remotely, if at all, to show
earning capacity or decedent's own living expenses. When the evi-
dence on non-support, however, is coupled with the inventory of
decedent's estate there is an indication of the decedent's personal ex-
penditures, and on this ground these two offers could be relevant, for
if a man has given his family a small amount of his wages and his estate
shows almost nothing, then a high degree of probability exists that per-
sonal expenditures were high. But as pointed out by the dissent, there
was nothing in the record to show that deceased's contributions to his
family were controlled by the support order. Accordingly this com-
bination of evidence has little probative value.
Inasmuch as the majority opinion would permit the excluded evi-
dence to come in to show lack of provident attitude, this case seems
to be out of line with the other North Carolina cases holding to a strict
net-income theory and rejecting the loss to beneficiaries theory.
BASIL SHERRILL.
Domestic Relations-Actions-Wife's Tort Liability to Husband
In Scholtens v. Scholtens,' plaintiff husband brought an action against
his wife to recover damages for personal injuries which he received in
an automobile accident allegedly caused by her negligence. Thus the
"Russell v. Windsor Steamboat Co., 126 N. C. 961, 36 S. E. 191 (1900).
"8218 N. C. 320, 11 S. E. 2d 341 (1940).
1" Warner v. Western N. C. R. R., 94 N. C. 250 (1886).
" Hicks v. Love, 201 N. C. 773, 161 S. E. 395 (1931).
1230 N. C. 149, 52 S. E. 2d 350 (1949).
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